often prefer to resort to violence to quell peaceful public protests, which, in turn, can result in gross human rights violations, including torture, arbitrary detention, and extrajudicial killings. However, political rulers have limited physical capacity to implement their policy decisions, including rights violations and violent repression of peaceful anti-government protesters, but rather have to rely on administrators such as security and military forces to execute their policies, whether legal or illegal (Cox 2011a; Dixit 2010) .
That political rulers depend on administrators for policy implementation is an institutional fact of both pre-modern and modern polities.
2 Yet scholars have not systematically explored how the separation of policy-making from policy execution can induce government compliance with legal limits in practice. We know little about the incentives and interactions among the state officials who make and implement policy decisions, and, as a result, the specific mechanisms by which legal limits can constrain the behavior of those people who are in a position of violating human rights are not well understood.
In this paper, we develop a game-theoretic analysis of an interaction between a political ruler and administrators to uncover two mechanisms by which legal limits, understood in terms of fundamental human rights, can be self-enforcing in practice. First, we show how the effectiveness of such legal limits depends on administrators' expectations that participating in human rights violations might be costly for them in the future. If such violations make the administrators vulnerable to the possibility of sanctions when the ruler's grip on power ends, they are more reluctant to exert effort when the ruler asks them to implement illegal policies. In turn, such administrative foot-dragging can induce the ruler to stick to legal policies, despite his preference for illegal policies -the ruler may be better off if he gets high 2 For example, pre-modern forms of bureaucracies existed in ancient Egypt and Sumeria, the late Roman Empire, the Byzantine Empire, the Caliphate, and most notably in Imperial
China (Finer 1997) . And it goes without saying that, in modern polities, the effectiveness of policy implementation depends crucially on administrators.
implementation effort for a less preferred, but legal policy than if he gets low implementation effort for his preferred, but illegal policy.
Second, we show how the effectiveness of legal limits depends endogenously on the strategic interaction within the government. The administrators face a coordination problem when the ruler asks them to execute policies involving rights violations, which implies that multiple equilibria of implementation effort are possible. As a result, the ruler's equilibrium cost for violating the law, which arises from his dependence on administrators for policy execution, is also a function of how administrators coordinate their implementation effort. This cost is lower if administrators coordinate on a high rather than a low implementation effort. The difference between the ruler's equilibrium cost in the low effort equilibrium scenario and the high equilibrium effort scenario can be thought of as an endogenous cost of violating the law. We show that this endogenous cost can be the most important factor in explaining the effectiveness of legal limits.
Factors that affect how administrators coordinate their expectations can then play an important role in inducing government compliance with legal limits. This allows for the possibility that human rights laws, if their core precepts are widely-known, may induce compliance by making a particular behavior salient to administrators. If human rights laws highlight which government actions are legitimate 3 and if they are common knowledge (in the sense that everyone knows that everyone else knows the gist of these laws, and so on), they can coordinate administrators' expectations about each other's actions. Our analysis then suggests that investments in the advocacy and publicity of human rights laws can have an effect on government compliance with legal limits by affecting administrators' expectations 3 Human rights laws such as prohibitions on torture or summary killings point to certain appropriate behavior such as no torture or no summary killing, which may suggest low effort to be appropriate when administrators are ordered to implement policies that violate these rights.
about each other's actions when asked to execute policies involving rights violations.
Our analysis contributes to a general understanding of the mechanisms by which law limits the exercise of public authority (Hardin 1989; Weingast 1997) . The existing scholarship suggests that laws are self-enforcing only if the costs of disobeying the law outweigh the benefits (Holmes 2003) . In these accounts, the effectiveness of law in limiting the government mirrors the effectiveness of mechanisms by which the government can be sanctioned for violating the law. In the spirit of these studies, our work shows that the more effective the likelihood of sanctions on administrators for executing illegal policies, the more effective are the limitations on the exercise of government power, all else equal. Such sanctions, we show, are necessary to constrain a ruler who otherwise would prefer an illegal policy. However, sanctions alone do not fully explain the extent to which the ruler respects legal limits. The possibility of sanctioning administrators for past rights violations opens up a different channel, apart from sanctions, through which legal limits can be effective. How administrators coordinate their actions when asked to execute an illegal policy also determines the extent to which legal limits effectively constrain the ruler.
The article adds to a small but growing political economy literature that emphasizes the interaction between the rulers and administrators as an important element for the emergence of constitutional government (Cox 2011b; Gonzlez de Lara, Greif and Jha 2008; Greif 2008; Myerson 2006 ). Myerson (2006) develops a model of autocratic politics to show how features of constitutional government can develop from basic problems of trust in the relationships between rulers and their supporters. Greif (2008) suggests that the dependence of the rulers on administrators for policy implementation is key to our understanding of the emergence of constitutional states. Cox (2011) argues that the institution of ministerial responsibilityholding the royal advisors and ministers accountable to the Parliament for all consequences of the Crown's policies-solved the moral hazard problem that generated the king's malfeasance before the English Glorious Revolution. We contribute to this scholarship by developing a game-theoretic model of an interaction between a ruler and administrators to illustrate some novel mechanisms through which legal limits, understood in terms of fundamental rights, can be self-enforcing in practice.
The article also contributes to a theoretical debate about the mechanisms by which law affects behavior. The positivist account of the law posits that legal rules are just threats backed by sanctions (Austin 1977) . Without denying the power of sanctions, some scholars suggest coordination as another mechanism for generating legal compliance (Almendares and Landa 2007; Calvert 1992; McAdams 2000; McAdams 2009; Myerson 2004; Myerson 2010; Sugden 1986) . The existing studies mostly analyze how law can coordinate the citizens' expectations and suggest that (private) law can generate some compliance expressively, apart from its sanctions. We add to this literature in two ways. First, we show how coordination within the government is important for understanding the conditions under which (public) law can limit the government itself. Second, our study indicates that both sanctions and coordination can simultaneously affect the efficacy of legal limits; our analysis also permits a comparison of the effectiveness of these two mechanisms.
The article proceeds as follows. We begging with the formal model and then present the analysis. We next provide some extensions and robustness exercises on our basic framework, and, finally, we discuss some implications of our analysis.
Model
Consider the set of all possible governmental policies, p ∈ R + and let, without loss of generality, L = [0, ] be the set of governmental policies that are permissible under the legal standard . In other words, represents a legal limit on the exercise of government power so that not everything the government does is legal: only policies p ≤ are legal while policies p > are illegal. As mentioned, this legal standard can be understood in terms of fundamental human rights established in customary international law, international bill of rights and/or domestic constitutions, including prohibitions on torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, on extrajudicial killings and summary executions, on forced disappearances, and on prolonged arbitrary detention. Higher law constraints in the form of fundamental human rights are the prevailing contemporary norm. The fact that most countries -including authoritarian states -have signed various international human rights treaties and conventions (Simmons 2009 ) and also have written constitutions containing bills of rights (Law and Versteeg 2011) indicates the normative force of human rights. 
Administrator i's utility from the policy outcome is given by G i (p,ē). We make no assumption whether the administrators prefers a legal or an illegal policy; also, this part of the administrators' utility function can vary among administrators. Administrator i also gets an effort payoff Π(e i ) for executing the policy, where Π(·) is single-peaked and concave in e i with Π (0) > 0, Π < 0, lim e→∞ Π (e) < 0.
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Administrator i's utility also depends on whether she implements a legal or an illegal 6 The single peakness condition implies that the ruler has a most preferred policy, which can be legal or illegal. Therefore one can think of the ruler's utility from policy as implicitly capturing both the direct benefits from policy as well as the potential (direct) costs for choosing an illegal policy. When executing such illegal decisions, the administrators can never be certain that there will be no future (legal or non-legal) costs for their actions. This is the case since the ruler can at best guarantee impunity for as long as he maintains power. However, even a ruler with an absolute power today does not have a perpetual hold on governmental power. To formalize these ideas, let administrator i's expected cost for executing an illegal policy
The function t(ē) represents the likelihood that the current ruler loses power in the future, as seen from administrator i's perspective at the time of executing an illegal policy p > . The ruler's likelihood of holding power is higher if administrators put more effort into executing the illegal policy p, and thus t(ē) decreases inē (with t < 0 and t > 0). For example, if the ruler orders the violent repression of peaceful demonstrators, the ruler is more likely to maintain power if the security and military forces put high effort into quelling public dissent. After the current ruler loses power, it is possible but not certain that administrator i will be held accountable for past human rights violations for various reasons including incomplete evidence of past crimes, scarcity of resources, and political will.
Thus let s represent the probability that administrator i is held accountable for executing an illegal policy when the ruler is out of power.
If administrator i is held accountable (which happens with probability t(ē) · s), let K(e i ) represent the cost for executing an illegal policy. This cost increases in administrator i's own effort level e i with K > 0, K > 0; that is, administrators who were more involved in the execution of illegal policies face higher expected legal and/or non-legal penalties. The preceding discussion does not assume that administrator i will pay a cost for sure for executing a policy involving right violations; but only that an administrator can never be certain that there would be no future consequences at the time of executing an illegal policy. We make no assumption about the magnitude of the expected cost t(ē) · s · K(e i ); it can be low or high, depending on the strength of the institutional mechanisms for imposing such costs after the ruler is out of power. We simply want to investigate the mechanisms by which government practices can be consistent with legal limits given the possibility of future sanctions on administrators for (past) illegalities; we will discuss how changes in the magnitude of these expected costs affects the effectiveness of legal constraints as a comparative statics exercise.
Let τ (p, ) be an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the policy is illegal (i.e, p > ) and 0 otherwise. For simplicity of exposition, we denote t(ē)·s = T (ē), with the interpretation that this represents the likelihood that administrator i pays a cost for executing an illegal policy. Then, administrator i s utility function is
The sequence of the game is as follows. First, the ruler chooses a policy, p. Second, all administrators simultaneously choose their respective level of effort, e i .
Analysis
We solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. We first analyze the administrators' optimal choice of effort and then the ruler's optimal policy.
The Administrators' Choice of Effort
In the last stage, the administrators choose how much effort to exert given policy p. Maximizing administrator i's objective function (1) implies that her optimal level of effort is the solution of the following first order condition:
Because the second derivative is Π (e i ) − τ (p, )T (ē)K (e i ) < 0, the optimization problem is strictly concave in e i and therefore equation (2) characterizes administrator i's optimal level of effort. Moreover, because all administrators face the same optimization problem, given by equation (2), they choose the same equilibrium action e i = e * . As a result, administrator i's optimal level of effort is also the average level of effort, i.e.ē = e * . Substitutingē = e * in equation (2) we get
The equilibrium level of effort depends on the relationship between the policy p and the legal limit . If the ruler asks the administrators to execute a legal policy (i.e., p ≤ ), administrator i's faces no penalty, and the equilibrium level of effort in this case, denoted by e * leg , is the unique solution of the following first order condition:
On the other hand, if the ruler asks the administrators to execute an illegal policy (p > ), administrator i's expected penalty for (past) illegalities is positive. The equilibrium level of effort in this case is the solution of the following first order condition:
In this situation, there are potentially multiple equilibrium levels of effort, denoted by e * illeg , that solve equation (3). To see this, note that the derivative of expression (3) is
which has an indeterminate sign because the first term and the third term (including the minus sign before it) are negative while the second one (including the minus sign) is positive. When the positive effect outweighs the negative one, the left-hand side of equation (3) increases inē over some range of values, and therefore there are potentially multiple solutions of equation (3), each corresponding to a different equilibrium level of effort. Such a situation is illustrated in Figure 1 , where there are three possible equilibrium effort levels
The multiplicity of equilibria in this implementation subgame is the result of a coordination game predicated upon the fact that the ruler's grip on power depends on how much effort the administrators put into executing illegal policies. If all administrators exert high effort, the ruler is more likely to maintain power in the future and thus the administrators' likelihood of sanctions for their illegal actions may decrease substantially. In this case, the second term in equation (3) is small, and e * illeg is close to e * leg , the value that maximizes Π(·). In this equilibrium, administrators essentially disregard the possibility of punishment because it is very unlikely to occur. In contrast, if all administrators coordinate on a lower effort level, then T (e * illeg ) can be large, and consequently the individually optimal level of effort e * illeg is substantially smaller than e * leg .
Also, if we evaluate equation (3) at the equilibrium level of effort given a legal policy, e * leg , then it is equal to −T (ē)K (e i ), which is strictly negative. This implies that the admin- The policy that would maximize the ruler's utility if he had to choose a legal policy, the best legal policy, solves the following constrained optimization problem: 
Intuitively, i is defined such that the ruler is indifferent between choosing policy i and getting high implementation effort e * leg and choosing the optimal illegal policy, p r (e * illeg ), and getting low implementation effort e * illeg . Proposition 3 shows that the ruler's equilibrium policy depends on whether the legal constraint is above or below i .
Proposition 3. The ruler's equilibrium policy is
.
Proof. In Appendix. Figure 2 illustrates the three possible situations that Proposition 3 identifies. 
Rule of Law Mechanisms
The preceding analysis suggests two mechanisms by which government practices are consistent with the legal limit . First, there is a mechanism that works through the possibility of sanctions on administrators for (past) rights violations. Because the effectiveness of policy depends on administrative effort, the ruler can suffer policy implementation losses when demanding that administrators execute an illegal policy. Thus, a ruler might be better off with a legal policy and high implementation effort than with a illegal policy and low implementation effort. The possibility of future sanctions on administrators is necessary to constrain a ruler who prefers an illegal policy. However, this opens up a different channel through which legal limits can be effective: how administrators coordinate their choice of effort when asked to implement an illegal policy influences the extent to which the legal limit constrains the ruler. Consider two possible equilibrium levels of effort, e The relevance of this coordination mechanism is perhaps illustrated when the ruler faces mass demonstrations and needs to resort to violent repression and thus gross human rights violations to keep power (Hardin 1995) . How the security and military forces respond to a potential order to violently quell peaceful demonstrators can decisively affect how likely it is that the ruler complies with fundamental human rights. If soldiers were to refuse using force against demonstrators, the ruler is effectively constrained in his policy options and its grip on power is likely to fade. On the other hand, if soldiers were to intervene forcefully against the demonstrators, the ruler is less constrained in his policy options. We next present a parametric analysis to illustrate both how we can assess the relative effectiveness of the two mechanisms and that the coordination mechanism can have the determining effect in inducing legal compliance. To this end, let administrator i's effort payoff be Π(e i ) = β 1 e i − β 2 e 2 i . Then the first-order condition for the equilibrium level of effort when the ruler complies with the legal limit (i.e., p ≤ ) is β 1 − 2β 2 e i = 0. As a result, effectively order violent repressions and lost power; in countries such as Bahrain and Syria where soldiers were willing to use force against demonstrators, the rulers prolonged their stay in power. Also, let the likelihood of being held accountable for past illegal actions for administrator i be given by the following logistic function that is symmetric around 1:
Also, let administrator i s cost (in the event that administrator i is held accountable) be K(e i ) = κ 1 e i + κ 2 e 2 i , where κ 1 , κ 2 > 0.
To solve for the size of the rule of law region, consider the following parameter values: 
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We can then analyze the implications of these different potential equilibria for the size of the rule-of-law region. To do so, let the ruler's utility be U R (p,ē) = −|p r − p| +ē. and getting low implementation effort, where the exact level of low implementation effort depends on which equilibrium administrators coordinate on in the implementation subgame.
Thus, i is defined by
which implies
Because the rule-of-law region is defined as [ value, due to the coordination mechanism, is more than 10 times the value of the rule-of-law region resulting from the sanctions mechanism. As a result, in this parametric example, the administrators' coordination on low implementation effort determine most of the extent to librium than in the low effort equilibrium, but for different parameter values, this relation can be reversed.
11 In this case, p and e are independent in the ruler's utility function, and thus the ruler's most preferred policy is p r .
which the ruler complies with legal limit .
The existence of multiple equilibria of effort implies that, in principle, administrators could also condition which equilibrium level of effort they play on which illegal policy the ruler chooses. Such conditioning by administrators could effectively deter the ruler from choosing policies in the region where the administrators would play the low effort equilibrium and so, in effect, could provide an important constraint on the ruler.
To show this effect, consider the previous parameter values and let p r = 3 and = 1.8. We obtain our results under the assumption that the administrators face potential punishments for implementing illegal policies only when the ruler is out of power. In other words, a ruler who orders rights violations can make credible commitments to administrators, who implement those abuses, not to sacrifice them on the altar of political expediency while he keeps the reins of power. However, the ruler may find it politically expedient to sacrifice the administrators after an illegal policy is implemented, either to obfuscate his own role or as a bargaining chip in dealing with other actors. The mechanisms of constraint previously identified are even more effective if administrators also fear sanctions for implementing illegal policies because the ruler cannot credibly commit to shield them from punishment while in power.
Comparative Statics
In this section, we analyze how changes in the administrators' expected cost for executing an illegal policy affect the size of rule-of-law region. We have the following result:
enlarge.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition for Proposition 4 is as follows. When the expected cost for illegal actions increases (for example, the function T (·) shifts up), the equilibrium level of effort e * illeg decreases. This is true for each equilibrium of the implementation subgame administrators play when p > . As a result, the value of the cutoff policy, Different factors can affect the value of T (·) and K (·) including whether a polity is democratic or not. The possibility of a governmental change is institutionalized in democracies since elections are held at regular time intervals, which implies that the (ex-ante) expectation that there can be a change in power is larger in democratic than in authoritarian regimes.
Also, institutional mechanisms that affect the likelihood of penalties for past illegalities, including separation of powers, free mass media, independent judiciary, and a strong civil society are stronger in democratic than in autocratic regimes. All these factors imply that the rule-of-law region is higher in democratic polities -a comparative statics result that matches the observed empirical pattern that government compliance with individual rights is higher in democratic than in non-democratic polities, all else equal (Stephenson 2003) .
Proposition 4 indicates that higher expected costs for implementing an illegal policy induce more legal compliance, given a particular equilibrium level e * illeg . However, from an empirical perspective, the possibility of multiple equilibria may create challenges when estimating the effectiveness of sanctions on legal compliance, especially in cross-national studies.
12 To see this, suppose that we compare two countries where all exogenous parameters are the same except that the administrators' costs for past illegalities are K 1 (·) in the first country and K 2 (·) in the second, and these marginal costs are such that K 2 (·) > K 1 (·). If the equilibrium level of effort e * illeg when p > is the same in the two countries (either the low or the high effort), then the rule-of-law region is larger in the country where the marginal cost is K 2 (·). 13 However, if the administrators coordinate on the low equilibrium level of effort in the country where the marginal cost is K 1 (·) and on the high equilibrium level of effort in the country the marginal cost is K 2 (·), then, even if the legal constraint is the same, a ruler may choose to adhere to the law under K 1 (·), but to violate the law under K 2 (·).
12 Multiple equilibria also provide a channel though which a culture of legality within administration can matter. Indeed norms that prohibit bureaucrats from acting on illegal directions from political leaders are well entrenched in advanced democracies. For example, in New Zealand, public servants are informed that ministers' directions should be rejected if "it is reasonably held that instructions are unlawful because it would be unlawful for the minister to issue them" (New Zealand, State Services Commission, The Senior Public Servant at 28, quoted in Kernaghan (2003) ). 13 We assume here that the parameters are such that the same number of multiple equilibria levels of effort when p > are supported under both K 2 (·) and K 1 (·).
Under these conditions, it is possible that the legal constraint is more likely to be respected in the first country although the administrators' expected cost for implementing an illegal policy is higher in the second country.
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Robustness and Extensions
In this section, we discuss the robustness of our basic results to alternative modeling specifications and also provide some extensions on our framework.
Extensions on the Basic Model
First, in the basic model, administrator i gets an effort payoff, Π(e i ), regardless of whether the ruler remains in power or not. 15 We can also work under the alternative assumption that the administrators get an effort payoff only if the ruler stays in power. Recall that the probability that the ruler stays in power is 1 − t(ē). In this case, administrator i's utility function (1) is
We can divide this objective function by [1 − t(ē)], which is independent of administrator i's choice. This gives
sK(e i ).
s. Because the first term of the preceding expression does not depend on e i , this objective function has the same form as administrator i's objective function in our 14 For a different analysis of the effects of multiple equilibria on government policy see Glazer and Rothenberg (2005) . 15 This assumption can be interpreted as capturing the intrinsic payoff from exerting effort. basic set up. Consequently, all results of the basic model obtain in this variation as well. Second, we model legality in the basic framework as an on/off variable: if the ruler asked the administrators to execute an illegal policy, the administrators' risk of being penalized in the future is independent of "how illegal" the policy is. More realistically, one can think that the administrators' expected penalty is increasing in the extent to which the ruler's policy transgresses the legal constraint , which can be captured formally by assuming that τ (p, ) is increasing in p for p > . Thus let τ (p, ) = 0 if p ≤ , lim p→ + τ (p, ) = 0, and The results of our basic model are in fact stronger if the severity of sanctions increases in the extent to which the ruler's policy exceeds the legal limit. In this situation, the likelihood of future penalties on administrators has some effect on the ruler's chosen policy even when the ruler's optimal choice is to ask the administrators to execute an illegal policy. Even in this case, the ruler will not choose his ideal policy but rather a policy lower than p r (e * illeg ), which implies that the rule-of-law region expands relative to the rule of law region from the basic model. The intuition is that a slight decrease in the ruler's chosen policy, starting from the ruler's ideal policy, has a negligible direct effect on the ruler's utility, but strictly increases the administrators' implementation effort, which has a first-order effect on the ruler's utility.
In certain situations, it might not be possible to vary the severity of legal penalties in accordance with the illegality of the policy, perhaps because the legal penalty is maxed-out.
16
16 In other words, there is a bound on the legal penalties that can be imposed for a given legal transgression; for example, life in prison might be the maximal penalty that can be In such cases, one can still provide incentives for more restrained policy if the ruler disobeys the law by varying the certainty of the legal constraint. That is, suppose that policies p ≤ are unambiguously legal. In contrast, policies p > might be legal, however if p is further away from , such a policy is less likely to be legal (i.e., higher policies are more likely to result in penalties for administrators when p > ). This situation can also be captured formally by assuming that τ (p, ) = 0 if p ≤ , lim p→ + τ (p, ) = 0, and
Under these conditions, as previously mentioned, when the ruler's optimal choice is an illegal policy, the ruler will not choose his ideal policy (as in the model where policies below are unambiguously legal while policies above are unambiguously illegal) but rather a more restrained policy (i.e., a policy closer to ).
Uncertainty about Regime Strength
In the basic analysis, we assume that all administrators have the same expectation regarding 
Discussion
Overall our analysis suggests that the institutional design of the interactions between political rulers and administrators is important for understanding the mechanisms that trigger government compliance with the law in practice. In this context, establishing institutional norms that prohibit administrators from acting on illegal directions from political leaders can have a substantial effect on achieving the rule of law ideal. Bureaucratic norms of this sort are well entrenched in advanced democracies; fostering such norms of administrative behavior might strengthen the rule of law in countries undergoing rule of law reforms.
Our analysis also has some policy implications regarding the question of whether lowerlevel governmental officials should be held accountable for involvement in rights violations.
From a policy perspective, our analysis suggests that even if political leaders are difficult to be held accountable for ordering rights violations, they can still be effectively constrained if administrators are sanctioned for past human rights violations. Leaders might be difficult to be held liable for ordering legal violations once they leave office for various political reasons, including the political reluctance of new leaders to prosecute former leaders, for fear of political instability or retaliation. By contrast, it may be easier to hold administrators liable both because, from a legal perspective, they are the direct perpetrators and also because, from a political perspective, administrators might not have sufficient political clout to oppose ex-post punishments.
Our analysis tends to favor punishing lower-level officials for implementing illegal policies, at least under conditions where doing so would induce the leaders to comply with the law.
It may seem unfair tough to punish lower-level officials, who were "just following orders" when political leaders, who ordered those transgressions, remain unpunished. Although such fairness concerns are important, lower-level officials will be more likely to follow the leaders' orders when asked to implement illegal policies if they expect amnesties for past illegalities, which, in turn, increases the leaders' incentives to disregard legal limitations. As such, there can be tensions between providing ex-ante incentives, by committing to a policy of punishing lower-level officials for past illegalities, and ensuring ex-post fairness, by not imposing penalties on lower-level officials when leaders escape punishments.
A dynamic implication of our model is that the ruler would try to avoid the resistance of administrators to its illegal policies. First, if possible, the ruler would try to conceal illegal policies, which implies that the ruler's ability to keep policies secret for the long term decreases his need to follow the law while transparency and governmental leaks increase his observance of the law. 17 Second, if possible, the ruler would prefer to appoint to administrative positions family members or other people irrevocably identified with his regime (such as members of the same ethnicity, for example) because they might already be in a position where they will suffer costs with certainty if the regime falls, so they will do anything to preserve the regime, including implementing any illegal policy.
18 Casual ob-servation suggests that this phenomenon is prevalent in some authoritarian regimes. For example, in Libya, Gaddafi kept the military weak and underfunded but his own private army well trained and strong, while appointing family members to key economic and political positions. Third, if possible, the ruler would prefer to insert vague emergency clauses in constitution so that he can order rights violations under a plausible legal cover when his hold on power is threaten. For example, nineteenth-century constitutions in Latin American contained emergency clauses allowing executive authorities "to take all the necessary measures" to meet internal threats (Loveman 1993) , and such vague provisions were often used to quell peaceful public dissent.
Our analysis complements existing studies that examine the importance of coordination among citizens in supporting the rule of law (Fearon 2011; Weingast 1997) . For example, Weingast (1997) argues that effective constraints on political power require the collective opposition of citizens when the ruler transgresses legal limits. However, classical dilemmas of collective action can hamper the occurrence of such mass protests; that is, citizens may fail to coordinate their efforts and take concerted action even if the ruler's illegal policies are widely unpopular.
In our framework, constraints on the ruler can be imposed indirectly by affecting the likelihood of sanctions on administrators and by affecting how administrators coordinate their behavior if asked to execute illegal policies. These mechanisms can work even when the public does not take direct action against the ruler in the present time. This is the case because, even if there is no present popular opposition against illegal actions, administrators cannot be certain that there will be no future consequences for past illegalities when the ruler is out of power. Moreover, sanctioning administrators does not require popular collective action to demand the punishment of past legal violations. A future regime might investigate and prosecute past human rights violations in response to demands of international actors, work.
human rights organizations, and activists seeking justice for victims (O'Donnell 2009; Requa 2012 ).
The substantive focus of our model is to uncover some mechanisms by which legal limits can constrain the exercise of public authority; however, the game-theoretic analysis of the interaction between the ruler and the administrators has more general applicability. In fact, one can put the gist of the model more generally: because rulers do not have a perpetual hold on power, a ruler may be constrained in his policy choices insofar as subordinates fear that they might be punished for their role in implementing a particular policy associated with the respective ruler. As such, the framework could be further developed to investigate the mechanisms by which rulers' opportunistic behavior might be reduced, especially in weakly institutionalized environments. Proof of Proposition 4. Since both T (·) > 0 and K (·) > 0, the left-hand side of (3) shifts down as the functions T (·) or K (·) shift up. Inspection of Figure 1 shows that, as the function depicted in Figure 1 shifts down, all stable solutions of (3) (i.e., those solutions where the left-hand side of (3) is downward-sloping) decrease. Thus, the corresponding 
